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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RUSS BULLOCK, JUNE MUNDY

BULLOCK,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
-vsJOE BAILEY AUCTION COMPANY,
et al,

Defendants and
Respondents,
JOE

Case No. 14845

BAILEY AUCTION CO. ,

Third Party Plaintiff and
Respondent,
-vsWESTERN SURETY COMPANY,

Third Party Defendant and
Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants Russ Bullock and June Mundy'Bullock commenced this action seeking a temporary restraining order prohibiting respondent Joe Bailey Auction Co., Inc., from reclaiming
equipment sold by Bailey to Bullocks.

Respondent Bailey filed

a counterclaim against Bullocks and a third party claim against
appellant Western Surety Company, the corporate surety under
the temporary restraining order.

Against the Bullocks, respon-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dent sought recovery of damages allegedly suffered by r ea son
of the Bullocks' breach of the equipment sales agreement,
including expenses of resale and loss of commission due to
lower resale price.

Respondent also sought damages from the

Bullocks and the appellant corporate surety for expenses
incurred by reason of the allegedly wrongful issuance of the
temporary restraining order.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining

·

I

order, and at trial dismissed appellant Bullocks' complaint ana
entered judgment in favor of respondent on its counterclaim
and third party complaint.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants Russ Bullock and June Mundy Bullock seek
reversal of the judgment against them for expenses incurred
by respondent Bailey in reselling the equipment and for loss
of commission due to the lower resale price on the ground that
respondent's reclamation of the equipment bars any other
remedy.
Appellants Russ Bullock, June Mundy Bullock and
Western Surety Company seek reversal of the judgment entered
against them for wrongful issuance of the temporary restrainin\
order on the ground that the order was not wrongful, but was I
issued under proper circumstances.
Appellants Russ Bullock, June Mundy Bullock and

~f the J. udgment entered
Wester Surety Company seek reversal O
·
against
t h em on t h e coun t s of respondents' counterclaim
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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as to the amounts awarded by the Court as damages, which
are unsubstantiated by the evidence presented at trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In late 1972, the appellants Russ Bullock and June
Mundy Bullock, then June Mundy, planned to enter the waterwell drilling business in Southern Utah.

Negotiations were

entered into with a leasing company to arrange financing
for a 5-year lease and purchase of the necessary equipment.
The appellants arranged to attend an auction to be conducted
by respondent in Ventura, California on December 15, 1972.
The morning of the auction appellants contacted

Mr. Parkes Shewmake, an auction official.

Mr. Shewmake is

one of respondent Bailey Auction Company's officers, and his
photograph and name were printed on auction brochures.
its D-2 and D-3.

Exhib-

According to the uncontroverted testimony

of June Mundy Bullock, appellants met with Shewmake at Shewmake's motel room on the morning of the auction.
(hereinafter T) 29:15-30.

Transcript

Bullocks told Shewmake that they

had arranged financing, and they together planned to verify
the financing by telephone because a written document was not
available.· T 29:19.

Phone verification of financing was made

between representatives of the leasing company and auction
company.

T 33:19-34:5.

The auction was underway at this time,

but Bullocks had not yet been allowed to bid.

T 37:14-38:9.

After the verification was made, Parkes Shewmake did the
bidding for Bullocks, selecting the equipment they would
need.

I

L

T 50:9-20.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Bullocks were successful bidders on several lots
of equipment comprising a complete drilling outfit.

The equip-

ment was not then in operable condition however, and was left
on the auction site.

The site was controlled by some third

parties who had been involved in the auction, and for their
convenience, the equipment was moved to another spot on the
same site within a few weeks.
Bailey's~guard

T 59: 7-16.

Though respondent

was on the site for ten days (T 115:9), the

successful bidders were responsible for any loss of their
equipment. T 170:4-10, 175: 4-11.
Two weeks later, after the first of the year, the
Bullocks returned to the auction site.

Repairs eventually

costing several thousand dollars were begun on the equipment.
As the equipment was repaired, it was moved to Utah.

Shew-

make, an agent of respondent Bailey Auction Company, was
aware of the repairs and moving of equipment, having been
present when repairs were being made. · T 53:27; T 54; T 93:13;

94: 8.

Joe Bailey, President of respondent Bailey Auction

Company, claimed he was not personally aware of the repairs
or moving.

T 116:18.

Bailey indicated, however, that he

was personally unaware of what Shewmake knew or did as an
auction company official.

T 116:26, 122:16.

The equipment remaining at the lot was entrusted
.
by Bailey Auction Company to t h e parties
wh o were controllin·g-1
.
other activities on the premises.

T 115 ·.17-24.

These partieo

were cooperative with the truck driver who transported the
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[

equipment to Utah, and indicated to him equipment on which
Bullocks had been successful bidder.

T 105:28; 107:11-108:22.

Meanwhile, unexplained difficulties delayed the
financing.

In mid-January, 1973, as the equipment was being

moved to Utah, Mrs. Bullock met with Parkes Shewmake and a
representative of the leasing company in Las Vegas, Nevada
to discuss these financing problems.

Shewmake was aware

Mr. Bullock was not present because he was moving equipment
to Utah.

T 69:8. This testimony is uncontroverted.

Following

a phone call to Bailey the leasing company representative
suggested that Mrs. Bullock should make out a personal check
in the amount due for the equipment to give some evidence of
her intent to make payment.

T 71.

The check was marked on

the reverse: "Not to be presented to the bank for collection
until adequate financing is completed."

T 14:8.

Joe Bailey,

however, attempted to negotiate the check a few days later.
The day after the January meeting, the leasing company executed a letter of intent to grant financing to further
reassure Bailey Auction Company.

Exhibit P-3.

After the last piece of equipment went in transit
to Utah in late February, 1973, Joe Bailey called the parties
who controlled the lot, and objected to the moving of the
equipment.

Those individuals spoke with Mrs. Bullock, but

the question was moot as all the equipment was gone.

T 74.

By March, 1973, all the equipment had been transported
to Washington County, Utah, and was being guarded by a Bullock
employee, Bob Hood.

Hood informed Mrs. Bullock on March 4
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that Bailey Auction Company's accountant was in town and
intended to sell the equipment.

T 77 : 23 ·

At t ria
· l , Mr,

Bailey testified that he had already contacted other bidd~s
on the equipment at this time, sold part of the equipment
in question to one or more of them and the purchasers had
sent trucks to Utah (T 136:18-27), but these facts were
then unknown to the Bullocks.

T 117:26-118:1.

Because of

the threat of dispossession, Bullocks obtained the temporary restraining order March 4, 1973, at 2:00 p.m.

As a re-

sult of the issuance of this order, the intended purchaser's
trucks were unable to obtain the equipment, and returned to
Texas empty.

T 136:27-137:8.

Record, p. 219 H.

pense of this trip was assessed against appellants.

The exCosts

allegedly incurred by Bailey Auction Company to come to St.
George to have the temporary restraining order lifted were
also allowed as damages by the trial court.

When the

temporary restraining order was dissolved March 8, 1973, at
4: 00 p. m.

(T 18: 9) , the equipment was removed from Utah and

subsequently sold.
It was stipulated and testified at trial that the
resale of the goods was without notice to the Bullocks (T

19:5; 118:18-22; 200:4-8), and without published notice.
T 118:11.

.
pell ants
The court, nonetheless, assessed against ap

the costs of resale ($500. 00) and the amount of diminution
of respondents' commission caused by an allegedly lower
resale price ($750.00).

fiMnJ

Appellants, being without notice.

of the resale, obviously were unable to arrange
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rebid the equipment, which had been greatly improved and
repaired at appellants' expense.
ARGUMENT
Appellants Russ Bullock and June Mundy Bullock
maintain that the judgment below was erroneous in assessing
damages against them for costs of resale incurred by Bailey
Auction Company and the amount of diminution in cormnission
occasioned by resale at a lower price than that bid by Bullocks.

Such judgment was erroneous because Bailey Auction

Company elected its remedy by reclaiming the sold goods, and
thus is precluded from any further recovery.
Appellants Russ Bullock and June Mundy Bullock and
Western Surety Company maintain that assessment of any damage
against them for losses or expenses due to the temporary restraining order judgment was erroneous.

The claim of error

is made because allowance of such a judgment would vitiate
the Uniform Commercial Code, and there is no factual basis
or legal theory for such a judgment declaring the issuance
of the temporary restraining order improper.
POINT I
RECLAMATION OF THE AUCTIONED GOODS BARS ANY OTHER RECOVERY
In the present case, recovery of the auctioned
equipment was effected by the respondent.

Respondent con-

tends, however, that he is further entitled to recovery of
expenses and loss occasioned by resale.

Allowance of both

of these remedies is precluded by Article 2 of the Uniform
Corrrmercial Code.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a.

Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs th'
Auctions are clearly within the scope

the Sales article, by specific inclusion.
70A-2-328.

~

f A
o
rticle 2,

Utah Code Am.

The statute itself adopts the language of treatis;

and case authority in stating that "[a) sale by auction is
complete when the auctioneer so announces by the fall of the
hannner," Utah Code Ann. 70A-2-328(2).
Though respondent contended below that no sale was
made because there was no payment, the court did not so find. I
While the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state that
a condition of the sale was payment "by cash, cashier's check,
or acceptable financing," (Record p. 218 V5.) and that such
payment "was a condition precedent to the consumation [sic]
of such sale,"
was no sale.

(Record p. 218 4J3) that does not mean there
Since consummation in its usual sense means

"to complete or to carry out," the finding that payment was
a condition precedent to the completion of obligations under
the sale is consistent with the existence of a sale contract
subject to Article 2 .·

The contract made at the fall of an

auctioneer's gavel is executory, State v. Clinger, 238 P.2d
1145 (Idaho 1951), because the fall of the gavel only signifies acceptance of the offered bid and formation of a contract (see Corbin on Contracts, (One Vol. Ed) § 108 (1952)'
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27),not that the obligation1
of the contract are discharged.

I

· an· auction sale'is
In respon d ents ' counterc 1 aim
clearly pled.

Record 31 4J4.

Furthermore, prior to putting
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l

on evidence, it was stipulated to that the property in question was sold by the Bailey Auction Company to the Bullocks.
The testimony of Joe Bailey was replete with the use of the
words buy, sell, sale, purchase and purchaser.
T 169:15-16.

In fact,

~r.

T 8:28-9:1;

Bailey admitted that the bid was

accepted when the actioneer said sold and that the responsibility for the items then rested with the bidder.
175:8-11.

T

The facts in this case clearly fall within the

definition of a sale as set forth in 70A-2-328, subject to
Article 2.

This case is one of offer, acceptance and breach

of contract by the Plaintiffs.
Though the sale agreement had terms and conditions
one of which was payment there was a sale agreement nonetheless.

That fact brings the transaction within Article 2 of

the Code.

The fact that there has been no payment did not

mean there was no agreement, it simply meant there had been
a breach of the sale agreement by the appellants.
b.

Under Article 2 reclamation of goods bars any other remedy.
Remedies under Article 2 are enumerated in Part

Seven.

A seller's remedies for buyer's breach in general are

found in U.C.A. 70A-2-703.

Remedies enumerated are withhold-

ing or stopping delivery of undelivered goods, reselling the
undelivered goods and recovering the damages, recovery of
damages for nonacceptance of undelivered goods, or cancellation
of the sale with respect to goods yet undelivered.

This sec-

tion does not give the seller the right to repossess its
goods.

The official comment to Section 70A-2-703 states that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"[T]his section is an index section which gathers together
in one convenient place all of the various remedi'es open to
a seller for any breach by the buyer."

A prece d"ing section,

§70A-2-702 does give the seller a limited right to reclaim
the goods from the buyer upon the buyer's insolvency.

67

Am. Jur. 2d, "Sales", §575.

A similar right of reclamation

exists under §70A-2-507(2).

This should not be confused

with the right of repossession under Article 9 of the Code
dealing with secured transactions.
Under Article 2 the reclamation may only be made
under certain terms and conditions and "[s]uccessful reclama·
tion of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to
them." (Emphasis added)

U.C.A. 70A-2-702(3).

B~cause

the

respondent Bailey __Auction Company reclaimed the goods in
question the phrase just cited from §70A-2-702 should be
dispositive of this case.

Respondent Bailey Auction Company's ,

reclamation of the goods prohibits the grant of other
remedies.

Paragraph 3 of the official comment to §70A-2-702

indicates the theory behind this one action concept of Article
2.

Reclamation under 70A-2-702 allows such preferential

treatment as against other creditors, that no other remedy is
to be allowed a seller if a breach is remedied by reclamation.
The remedies claimed by the auction company in the
present case are actually those specified in 70A-2-703(d)
(authorizing resale and recovery of damages) and 70A-2-70 6,
(outlining the procedure for resale and recovery), and
70A-2-710 (allowing incidental damages.)

All ot
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1

dies, however, assume that the goods were never removed
from the Seller's control and thus never "reclaimed" as
provided under Section 70A-2-702.

Respondent, nevertheless,

was granted judgment for the costs of resale ($500.00) and
the diminution in his COTIIlilission by reason of the lower
resale price after his reclamation of the goods ($750.00).
Further, the trial court allowed a deficiency judgment and
incidental damages, when all of remedies are expressly
barred by 70A-2-702(3).
This argument, that reclamation precludes the
award of a deficiency judgment was made before the trial
court, T 135:1-3, and in appellants' Memorandum of Points
and Authorities submitted December 22, 1975.

Record, p. 190.

The.trial court's failure to apply Section 70A-2-702(3) to
this fact situation thus disallowing any remedy beyond the
self-help reclamation was error.
c.

Respondents' failure to comply with other sections of the
Code bars the remedies granted.
Respondent claimed, and was awarded damages -

for the deficiency of-the commission he actually received as
compared to the commission he would have received had
appellants made payment under the sale.agreement.

Section

70A-2-706 allows such a deficiency judgment only in a
situation where Seller has the right _to resell goods, for
example, where a breach occurs prior to delivery.

This

section of the Code requires that the resale be made in
good faith and in a reasonable manner, and where the resale
is private, the Seller must give the Buyer reasonable notice
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of his intent to resell.

The evidence was uncontradicted

that Bailey Auction Company failed to notify the appellants
of its intention to resell.

T 19:5; 118:18-22; 200:4-8.

Furthermore, the evidence showed that at the time of repossession, three trucks were enroute from Abilene, Texas, on
behalf of a buyer who had purchased part of the equipment in
question.

T 136:18-27.
Article 9 of the Uniform Cormnercial Code contains

language very similar to that found in Section 2-706 allowing
deficiency judgments.

Under §70A-9-504'·where a secured party

fails to give notice to the debtor of a sale, courts almost
uniformly hold that the secured party is denied any deficiency
rights he may have had against the debtor.

Skeels v. Universal

CIT Credit Corp., 222 F.Supp. 696, 1 UCC Rep.Serv. 639 (W.D.
Pa. 1963).

See, One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass.

App.Dec. 64, 5 UCC Rep.Serv. 792 (1968); In re Bro. Cliff,
Inc. , 8 UCC Rep. Ser. 1144 (Ref. Dec. W. D. Minn. 19 71) ; Associated Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S. 646
(Civ. Ct. 1956); Foundation Discounts Inc., v. Serna, 81 N.M.
474, 468 P.2d 875, 7 UCC Rep.Serv. 854 (1970).
For example, in the Georgia case of Braswell v. Am~j
National Bank, 117 Ga.App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420, 5

·ucc Rep.Serv.I

420 (1968), the Georgia Supreme Court held that f ai· 1ure to alle•.:
.·1
and prove proper notice under Section 9-504 precluded the plain·
tiff-creditor from recovering a deficiency judgment against
the debtor.

Likewise, in Baber v. Williams Ford Co., 23 9

Ark. 1054, "396 S.W.2d 302, 3 UCC Rep.Serv. 83 (1965), the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

I

J

Arkansas Supreme Court held th&t if the secured party were
to hold the debtor liable for any deficiency, " [ i] t must
give the debtor 'reasonable notice'".

Id. at 1057, 396

S.W.2d at 304, 3 UCC Rep.Serv. at 86.
U.C.A. 70A-2-706 provides for a similar form of
notificacion by the seller to buyer.

Here the seller failed

to notify the buyer of its intention to resell until after
the fact,

The policy applicable ·to the Article 9 cases as

cited above is equally applicable to an Article 2 case such·
as this one.

Denial of a deficiency judgment is the appro-

priate sanction in this case where the seller fails to give
notice.
POINT II
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO COMPENSATE FOR LOSS ALLEGEDLY OCCASIONED
BY THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WAS IMPROPER
The court awarded damages to respondent for the expenses incurred in the attempted repossession by respondent's
agents and also allowed the expense incurred by the second
purchaser when his trucks traveled to Washington County,
Utah, from Texas and returned without obtaining the equipment then subject to the temporary restraining order.

Find-

ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R., p. 219 V 12(a).
To allow respondent to recover such damages is to
allow a recovery of expenses for the doing of an illegal act,
and could only encourage contravention of the law.

The Court

has made appellants liable for respondent's expenses caused
by resistance to respondent's extra-legal repossession.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Court apparently felt that the attempted repo: :
session was justified because the Bullocks were not entitlec
to possession of the equipment and because the Bullocks hac
not "paid" for the equipment.
a.

Uncontroverted evidence indicates appellants' possession
was consensual.
Though the court found that the appellants took

u.,

equipment from the auction site without permission, there wa;
uncontradicted evidence to the contrary.

The consistent

testimony of June Mundy Bullock and r;len Stanley was that
Parkes Shewmake, an auction company official and the site
managers released the equipment without protest.
T 54; T 93:13; 94:8; T 105:28; 107:11-108:22.

T 53:27;

Joe Bailey

testified he was personally unaware of any acts of Parkes
Shewmake on behalf of respondent Bailey Auction Company. The
delivery of the equipment to the Bullocks was consensual and
they had the right to possession.

Of course, even if appel·

!ants' ·possession was nonconsensual Bailey had no right to a
repossession without. consent.

The courts were the proper

forum for Bailey Auction Company to seek a remedy.
The court further found that "payment ... [was]
to be made on the date of sale by cash, cashier's check, or
approved financing, and the Plaintiffs (appellants) did fail
to pay as provided and agreed" Findings of Fact ,5, R.21J.
This Finding also is unsupported by any evidence.

At no

point in the record is the testimony of June Mundy Bullock
contradicted that Bailey Auction Company had approved her

'

\

__J
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financing.

T 29:19; 33:19-34:5; 34:14-38:9.

Admittedly, the

financing fell through, and satisfaction of the debt was never
made, but on the day of the auction and for a period of time
thereafter, the
Company.
b.

financing was acceptable to Bailey Auction

See, Testimony of Joe Bailey, T 166:20-167:22.

Nonpayment did not justify the attempted self help reclamation.
In ruling for the dissolution of the temporary restrain-

ing order, the court relied on the nonpayment rationale:
Frankly, Mr. Allen, the Court intends to grant
Mr. Foremaster's Motion to Quash and Dissolve
the temporary restraining order, you having
admitted that the payment hasn't been made and
the Court having given you an opportunity to
state what the agreement is, doesn't believe
that's sufficient to restraining [sic] the
defendants from reassuming possession of this
particular piece of property ... [T]he facts of
life being what they are in all likelihood
Joe Bailey Auction Company and the other Defendants are entitled to the money that is due and
owing them. Reporter's Transcript (of hearing
on Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order,)
p. 5.
The court seems to have felt that because money was
yet owing under the sales agreement, repossession without
notice was a proper remedy, even though no security interest
was retained by the Seller. In the judgment below, the court
allowed respondent monetary damages for appellants' refusal
to allow respondent to successfully effect a self help repossession

without notice.

In so acting, however, appellants

may be said to have only required respondent to follow the
proper procedures outlined in detail by Article 2 of the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code.
The simple fact of a non-payment by appellants did
not justify
respondent's
nonconsensual
repossession
without
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided by
the Institute of Museum and Library
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notice.

Nonpayment was a breach of the sales contract made

when the gavel fell.

Remedies for breach listed in Article

2 of the Uniform Commercial Code simply do not include
reclamation without notice.

Section 70A-2- 702 allows recla-

mation only upon notice given within ten days of the sale,
or if there has been a misrepresentation of solvency by the
buyer, the notice may be given at any time.

Testimony did

not indicate that notice of repossession was ever given to
the Bullocks, nor did testimony show any discrepancy of under·'
standing between the Bullocks and the auction company as to
their solvency.

The right of reclamation under 70A-2-507(2) ,
I

is subject to the same limitations.

Section 70A-2-705 allows'

a reclamation of goods from a carrier, before they have reachei:
the buyer, but in this case the reclamation was made after
delivery to the buyer.
A case analogous to this present case is Stumbo v.
Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 444 P.2d 564 (Or. 1968).
supplied logs to Keystone, a mill which became

Stumbo

insolvent.

Keystone had failed to pay for logs delivered, so Stumbo
effected a self help repossession by pulling some logs from
Keystone's pond and selling them to Hult, another mill. Hult'!
agent retained the proceeds of the sale, and Stumbo sued for
that amount.

Southern Logging Company. which also supplied

logs to Keystone, sued to garnish the proceeds of the sale,
claiming the money was Keystone's property.

The rights of

Southern Logging Company and Stumbo to t h e money

depended

on the validity of Stumbo's self help reclamation.
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If Stumb 0

was justified in reclaiming the logs, the proceeds of the
sale were his.

If the reclamation was improper, the proceeds

belonged to Keystone and were subject to garnishment by
Southern Logging Company.

The Oregon Court examined the Uni-

form Commercial Code provisions cited above, noting the absence of a timely demand and that the logs were in Keystone's
possession and found the self help repossession unjustified.
Consequently, we conclude that plaintiffs
had no right to recover the logs from Keys tone and were no more than unsecured general
creditors without any interest in particular
assets of Keystone, including the logs taken
from Keystone's millpond. See generally,
Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contract Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform
Commercial Code; A Roadmap for Article Two,
73 Yale L J 199 (1963). Id., 572.
The attempted reclamation in this case was also not within
any of the sections of Article 2 and therefore the order
restraining this reclamation was proper.
encoura es contravention of the Uniform
To allow a seller damages for failure to successfully
remedy a situation through extra legal techniques not granted
nor condoned by the Uniform Commercial Code due to the buyer's
rightful resistance to those extra legal techniques is offensive to the law and the policy behind it.

Because respondent's

first attempted reclamation of the property was in direct
contravention of Utah law, there should be no compensation
for expenses incurred in pursuing an extra-legal remedy unsuccessfully and in being temporarily restrained by court
order in so pursuing that extra-legal and unlawful remedy.
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Simply stated, the appellants' n_etition for the t emnorary
restraining order and the issuance of the order itself was
properly done in light of the fact that appellant at the tk
of the order's issuance was proceeding directly in contravent
of Utah law.

To hold otherwise is to emaciate the protectiv
1

nature of the prophylactic provisions of Article 2 of the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code and to put a premium on selfhelp, no-noticed repossessions in contravention of the law.
POINT III
THE DAMAGES AWARDED ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE
Several of the amounts awarded against the appellan:
are not found at any point in the evidence.

At paragraph

ll(b) of the findings and conclusions, R.220, $1,500.00 is
included in the damage awarded as an amount pai!d tJo Parkes
Shewmake.

Joe Bailey testified at trial, without documentary

1

support, that Parkes Shewmake was paid "about two hundred
dollars a day" for six days (T 143: 10-29) and incurred $518.il:
i

in expenses. T 142:4-6.

Note since Shewmake would have been I

paid the same by Bailey whereever he was during those six day:,
because the figures testified to do not equal the amount awarOi!
one can only speculate how the court calculated this amount.
Paragraph 11 (c) of the findings and conclusions in·
dicates $800.00 was incurred as expenses by Joe Bailey. The
only evidence of Mr. Bailey's expenses was t h a t th ey amounted
to $3 70. 88.

T 145: 30.

Figures on this expense sheet were

challenged by appellants as expense account inflation.
T 196:27-197:6.
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j

Paragraph ll(d) of the findings and conclusion awards
$500.00 to respondent for expenses incurred by Cecil Biggs.
Bailey testified that Biggs was paid $500.00 wages during the period
in question.

T 146:13-21.

However, Bailey also admitted

that Biggs would have incurred this expense whether or not the
temporary restraining order had been issued.

T 196:18-20.

Therefore, no causation was shown as to these damages.
Also the source of the $500.00 figure for costs of
resale of in paragraph 13 of the findings and conclusions is
unclear.

Not knowing how the court calculated this amount,

since there was no testimony by Bailey of a cost of resale in
that amount, results in it being impossible to determine if
this award was proper.
Appellants submit that the absence of substantiation

by testimony or exhibit, for the amounts awarded by the court
renders the findings and conclusions illusory.

The apparent

use of balancing and approximation on some accounts is not
an acceptable method of measuring damages.
CONCLUSION
The judgmerit below granted recovery to respondent
(1) for expenses of effecting a resale of the auctioned
equipment and (2) for loss of commission by the resale
price being lower than the price agreed upon by appellants,
and also (3) for damages allegedly sustained when respondent
was restrained from effecting an illegal self-help repossession.
Appellants request reversal of the judgment below
on the ground that under the Uniform Corrrrnercial Code the respondent's reclamation of the property bars any other recovery,
including
incidental and deficiency damages and also because
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r
procedures to obtain such damages were not followed.

Also,

the temporary restraining order was properly issued, to Prev;·
respondents' extra-legal repossession, thus prohibiting any
recovery for its supposedly wrongful issuance.

Further, the

amounts of the awards are not supported by the evidence.
DATED this

:J'-!"!f!

day of June, 1977.

FRANK A. ALLEN

MAILING CERTIFICATE
.
I do hereby certify that on t h is

");/ ~
=-<_.,.._-_

d ay o f J une,

1977, I did mail a correct and true copy of the above and
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Mr. Phillip L. Foremaster,
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent, 49l~ E. Tabernacle,
St. George, Utah 84770.
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